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RELIGION IN DEMOCRACY:

TOCQUEVILLE'S DEFENSE

by Gary Novak and Kelly Patterson
It is sometimes held to be paradoxical that 1 iberal democracy has
offered no sound justification of itself. For those who are citizens of
liberal democracies, and therefore are concerned not only with the
regime of the fatherland but a 1so with the good regime ,enus, this
paradox causes not only confusion. The citizen is left a so without
justification for the patros: his love of the fatherland has then no
rational logos. There have been various recent attempts to provide
liberal democracy with the justification necessary to survive the attack
of various schools. However one assesses such attempts the serious and
circumspect student of democracy finds his attention drawn, with
increasing frequency, to Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville's
famous commentary on the American democracy.
It is rather well known that Tocqueville saw the hand of history
moving governments inevitably towards democracy. But it is not for this
reason that his book has become important. For the citizen who cannot
ignore Marx's attack upon the necessity of religion, Democracy in
America offers both the defense and the apology for the propagation of
religion in democracies.
This is not to say that Tocqueville
necessarily disagreed with Marx or that he provided the final apoloqia
for religion as such, or even one entirely effective against Marx.
Tocqueville saw political possibilities for religion in the regime
which, for Marx, could only be considered as among the most outward
forms of alienation.
The grounding of regimes on religious beliefs has become
increasingly scarce as more 11 secular 11 political ideologies have gained a
larger degree of popularity in the hearts and minds of citizens. For
numerous reasons, religious beliefs have been separated from the various
liberal conceptions of government which have been crafted in the modern
world.
The growing separation of religion, at least, from the
ideologies of liberal democracy appeared as an anarchy to Tocqueville
and therefore occupied a rather large portion of his writings.
Tocqueville made reference to this queer separation in a letter to a
friend.
What has always most struck me in my country, especially of late
yea rs, has been to see ranged on one side the men who va 1ued
mora 1ity, re 1i gi on, and ordf r, and on the other those who 1ove
liberty and legal equality.
Tocqueville considered the split between those who value religion and
those who love liberty to be dangerous. Implicit in his writings is the
desire to convince the French that religion and democracy are not only
compatible, but that religion is actually necessary to a democratic
regime.
In Democracy in America Tocqueville holds that religion is
useful, even necessary, to a democracy. Religion becomes necessary
because, among other things, of its tendency to control and moderate
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certain undesirable passions unleashed by the dynamic of democracy. But
Tocqueville's argument that religion is merely socially 11 useful 11 is one
confronted with diverse problems. To simply assert religion's social
utility, in the end, seems to derobe religion of its deepest and most
sacred meanings.
Furthermore, to argue, as Tocqueville did, that
religion must strive to adapt itself as much as is possible to the
various propensities of democracy places religion in an ambivalent
position which might ultimately strip religion of what actually makes it
useful. Tocqueville makes allusion to these problems in his writings,
but he does not explicitly address the implications of these dilemmas.
Tocqueville's thesis concerning religion's utility is therefore crippled
by certain inconsistencies which he resolves by tacitly admitting that,
in the final analysis, democracy ought to abandon religion in favor of
an "enlightened self-interest" which may save it from its inevitable
decline.
On the surface, at least, because of its seemingly straightforward
manner, the argument for religion's social utility seems appealing.
Tocqueville's references to the functional role of religion are legion;
most of the arguments are neither complicated nor detailed. Tocqueville
merely asserts that liberty can only be established ~ith morality, and
that morality cannot be established without faith.
To more fully
understand this apparently utilitarian assertion about religion, the
nature of liberal democracy and its self-destructive tendencies must
first be made clear.
Tocqueville's liberal democracy has been said to consist of
"equality of condition~, representative government, and personal and
intellectual freedoms."
These characteristics find their expression in
a variety of institutions, and Tocqueville is not as concerned with the
specific types of institutions that might reflect these ideals as much
as he is with the fact that the ideals ought to be the goal of the
institution. Tocqueville saw a crucial and distinctive embodiment of
these concepts in the American democracy, and although other countries
could never imitate the American experiment, it was clear that America
was an excellent though general and rough sketch of things to come. To
these cha racteri sti cs of liberal democracy Tocquevi 11 e added a concept
of historical evolution. For Tocqueville, 11 history 11 is ineluctably
moving both people and governments toward democracy. Thus, democracy is
not only characterized by specific social conditions, it is also
typified by the inevitability of its arrival.
The various occurrences of national existence have everywhere
turned to the advantage of democracy; all men have aided it by
their exertions, both those who have intentionally labored in
its cause and those who have served it unwittingly; those who
have fought for it and even those who have declared themselves
its opponents have all been driven along in the same direction,
have all labored to one end; some unknowingly and some despite
them~elves, all have been blind instruments in the hands of
God.
The historical movement is, therefore, a movement in which the various
social dialectics compel nations towards democracy, or rather towards
what Tocqueville called 11 a state of equality."
According to
Tocqueville, this movement is characterized by three main features: 11 it
is universal and permanent, it is daily passi~g beyond human control,
and every event and every man helps it along. 11
Since the advent of a
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democratic society is inevitable and is "daily passing beyond human
control , 11 it is man's duty to make the transition from an 'aristocratic'
age to a democratic age as smooth as is possible. Such attempts may in
the long run help societies to avoid some of the major problems which
confront nations during the transition to democracy. Yet it certainly
seems questionable whether man is able to prepare for and moderate
phenomena which appear to be largely out of his control. In an effort
to reconcile what appears to be a blatant determinism with a theory of
freedom, Tocqueville argues that
Providence has not created man entirely dependent or entirely
free.
It is true that around every man a fatal circle is
traced, beyond which he cannot pass; but within the wide verge
of that circle he is powerful and free; as it is with man, so
with communities. The nations of our time cannot prevent the
conditions of men from becoming equal; but it depends upon
themselves whether the principle of equality is to lead them to
servitude or frE'fdom, to knowledge or barbarism, to prosperity
or wretchedness.
One of the conditions which seems to be within man's "circle of
control , 11 and may be used in conjunction with the emerging principle of
"equality," is religion. Man may, within the sphere of choice open to
him, ascribe no importance or a cruci a 1 importance to the assorted
religious beliefs of his time. According to Tocqueville, this choice is
of the utmost importance since it is in the best interest of nations to
take religion seriously and to nurture it for the highest purposes.
This conclusion follows from Tocqueville's observation that "religion is
considered as the guardian of mores, and mores are regarded as the
guarante 8 of the laws and pledge for the maintenance of freedom
itself."
Tocqueville's claim about religion suggests the crucial
question about the nature of democratic societies:
What are the
features of democratic societies that require religious support to be
able to maintain democratic institutions?
The answer is found in Tocqueville's intriguing description of
democratic societies and especially in a careful examination of the
'individualism' that democratic society tends to produce.
This
individualism, the special democratic manifestation of egoism, when
connected to the equality of conditions generally found in democracies~
promotes a voracious desire in man for material well-being.
Self-interest and personal ambition, in Tocqueville's analysis, become
stronger as the social obligations of constraint and moderation, which
characterize an aristocratic age, are relaxed, and the notion of acting
in one's self-interest, in America the commercial iti1terests, becomes
acceptable through the various market justifications.
The possibility
that society will develop a powerful desire for material well-being
brings with it the potential danger that society will 1pecome atomized as
individuals strive to maximize their material gains.
Consequently, a
democratic society runs the risk of being divided into various competing
pockets of egoistic self-interest, eventually forming commercial
factions whose loyalty to the laws is not determined by any standard of
mores, but is sustained, rather, by the passion for the accumulation of
material goods. It is true that men may view each other as equals in a
democratic society since the rules of the 'economic game' at least
appear to be objective and neutral. However, men are certainly not
equal and do not see themselves as bound to act with regard to one
5

another with compassion, nor are they somehow compelled to mitigate
their selfishness. Thus, religion becomes necessary to legitimate moral
restraints, that is, customs and mores, the norms which make a decent
way of life possible, by enablifg it to promote the virtues of
moderation and sel f-restraint.
Religion, therefore, must be used
as a counterbalance
to the individualistic and hence egoistic
tendencies ~hich are unleashed in the equalitarian conditions of liberal
democracy. 1
It seems to be possible then, that religion provides a crucial
service in the maintenance of the virtues upon which a good society
necessarily rests. This idea is lucidly summed up by one author who
writes: "Virtue, in o1~er to have an influence on society, must have
other worldly support.
Yet it is not entirely clear how Tocqueville
expects religion to be able to support the virtues of society. In some
passages, Tocqueville seems to allude to immortality, to belief in a
reward in another life for submission to a principle of temperance now,
thus appealing to a kind of self-interest. Still other passages seem to
suggest a natural instinct for submission to religious authority.
"Having reached the limits of the political world, the human spirit
stops of itself; in fear it relinquishes the need of exploration; it
even abstains from lifting the veil of the sanctuary; it 1gows with
respect before truths which it accepts without discussion.
In his
work L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution, Tocqueville confirms the
preceding statement: 11 L'incredulite absolue en matiere de religion, qui
est si contraire aux instincts naturels de l'homme et met son ame dans
une assiette si douloureuse, parut attrayante a la foule. 11
Another dimension of Tocqueville's argument concerning the social
utility of 7religion deals with its influence on the "dominance of public
opinion."
Religion not only mitigates the individualistic tendencies
of a democratic society but also tempers the dominion of public opinion.
Religion can bind public opinion to a standard of conduct through
overtly promoting an enabled notion of equality and the rights of all
men. In this situation, men are not as likely to persecute one another
for holding ideas which somehow differ from their own.
Such a
moderating influence can be described as important since the
consideration for the rights of others is not something which "laws or
mores" can fully develop in citizens in and of themselves.
Thus, the lesson that Tocqueville wants men to learn about religion
seems to be clear. Religion ought to be nurtured and guarded as a way
by which the i 11 s of 'democracy' might be tempered and moderated. Yet
it appears to be at least paradoxical to assert, on the one hand, that
religion is a safeguard for democracy and ought to be preserved for that
reason, and yet to argue on the other hand, as Tocqueville does, that
religion must also adapt itself to democratic propensities. Throughout
Democracy in America, Tocqueville argues that a democratic society is
somehow contingent on religion; however, it also becomes apparent from
his writings that religion cannot be considered 18an independent
safeguard, since it is dialectically bound to society.
Tocqueville's
observation that society itself is subject to the opinion of the
majority seems to be a confirmation of the preceding point.
Religion,
he states, "itself holds sway mu~ less as a doctrine of revelation than
as a commonly received opinion.
The interdependence of religion and
democratic society exposes a paradox in Tocqueville's analysis and
therefore suggests some rather interesting questions.
For exa~ple, how
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will a religion that is gradually stripped by the encroachments of
self-interest to a set of general ideas about nature and god--that
submits to the tendencies of a democratic society in order to avoid
enraging public opinion, and that derives its influence from those
opinions of the majority--be able to generate a faith which is
sufficiently powerf~b to restrain or alter the behavior of men in a
democratic society?
The answer to this question is apparent and
readily admitted by Tocqueville--it is not entirely possible. The
concessions that religion must necessarily make to democracy in the
first place, in order to have any measure of influence, is only that of
a contract between a parasite and a host. Ultimately, religion has
sealed its own fate by renouncing its claim to be the transcendent truth
for society, the price of which is to be paid by in its own demise.
Another attack on religion comes not from the "opinion of the
majority," but from within the very nature of a democratic society. A
democratic society may exhort people to believe, but because of the very
laws \'lithin a democratic framework, it cannot tell people what to
believe. This dilemma--the exhorting to believe, but pro~iding nothing
to believe--indirectly allows people to believe anything.
A dilemma,
such as the one just described, could account for the extreme reluctance
of Tocqueville to become involved in the debate over the truth or
falsity of religion. In this instance, Tocqueville's chief task was to
find firm beliefs that seemed compatible with democracy and at the same
time produced a type of behavior conducive to the maintenance of
democracy. This task also involved 22e protection of useful religious
beliefs from skeptical objections.
Yet one thing is certain,
Tocqueville was not concerned with the truth-content as such of
religion. This sentiment is reflected in the following:
Certainly the doctrine of metempsychosis is not more reasonable
than that of materialism, but if it were absolutely necessary
for a democracy to make the choice between one or the other, I
should not hesitate, and should think the citizens run less
danger of reducing themselves to the level of brutes by thinking
that their soul wo~~ pass into a pig's body than by believing
that it is nothing.
This quote illustrates Tocqueville's attitude towards religion
throughout Democracy in America. Paradoxically, this attitude about
religion's social utility poses one of the greatest threats to religion
itself. The constant harangue of religion's utility, linked with the
disregard for its truth-content, threatens to undermine the very
influence of religion upon citizens.
Why should citizens of a
democratic society postpone the gratification of desires now if religion
cannot guarantee its promise about rewards in a future life? If the
truth of religion is its social utility, then what type of SUPP?[J: for
society can be expected when the "real truth" is discovered?
Is
religion's truth-content merely its social utility, or is there a
deeper, more sacred content to religion? And what about the individual
who decides that he will act as he pleases? What possible arguments
could persuade the egoist that it is in his best interest to cultivate
democratic virtues? Tocqueville's response to these questions reflects
his concern that if men were to discover that the context of their
beliefs is merely functional, the beliefs then no longer serve to build
democratic virtues. This concern seems to be at the root of various
passages which appear throughout his writings. For example:
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In such ages beliefs are forsaken through indifference rather
than hate; without being rejected, they fall away.
The
unbeliever, no longer thinking religion true, still considers it
useful.
Paying attention to the human side of religious
beliefs, he recognizes their sway over mores and their influence
of laws. He understands their power to lead men to live in
peace and gently prepare them for death. Therefore, he regrets
his faith after losing it, and deprived of a blessing whose
value he fully apP[~ciates he fears to take it away from those
who still have it.
He continues on the following page stating:
With unbelievers hiding their incredulity and believers avowing
their faith, a public opinion favorable to religion takes shape;
religion is loved, supported, and honored, and only to be
looking in to th~ 6depths of men's souls will one see what wounds
it has suffered.
This argument, at first glance seems to save religion from
undermining itself, that is, if one is only concerned with the utility
of religion and not its truth or falsity. But one must remember that an
increased respect for religion's social position does not fecessarily
mean a corresponding increased respect for religious life. 2 Examples
spread quickly through society and it is not difficult, as Tocqueville
would rather have his readers accept, to separate believers from
nonbelievers. It is dangerous to assert that simply because some do not
believe in religion that they will then not have an impact on society if
they simply do not openly confess their disbelief. In order for the
community as a whole to survive with the opinion that religion is only
functionally true, then a majority of the community would have to act as
though it really is, in the most fundamental sense, true. This is a
difficult 11 deception 11 if one does not really believe religion to be true
and one cannot then guarantee that the correct virtues will be practiced
by the youth.
Secondly, Tocqueville was not an incroyant who regarded his own
loss of faith as a liberation from illusion Af did a great many of the
skeptics of the 18th and 19th centuries.
Thus, Tocqueville was
willing to promote religion while some of his contemporaries were not.
Karl Marx, a contemporary, vigorously argued that religion was not only
false but an illusion which must eventually fade from society. Not only
was Marx an unbeliever, he rigorously campaigned against all types of
11
illusions 11 which seemed to divert man from his 11 species-being. 11 The
major difference between Marx and Tocqueville on the subject of religion
was that Marx saw no real social utility in religion while Tocqueville
perceived in it a great deal of utility and sought to protect it. Yet
Tocqueville's teaching that the truth of religion lies in its social
utility works only in an age when people are willing to remain silent
concerning their disbelief or remain in a quiet state of unbelief. In
this instance, where Tocqueville is confronted by the skeptical argument
against religion, he can offer no real defense since he has already
admitted that the truth-content of religion is of no serious concern.
Tocqueville openly exhibits an eagerness to adopt any 11 myth 11 which might
provide him with the necessary tools to tailor behavior to the needs of
democracy. But his very eagerness to adopt any 11 myth 11 only promulgates
the problem, either directly or indirectly, of the truth-content of
religion.
What options exist, therefore, for society?
Is society
8

compelled to accept any myth with the hope of forestalling democratic
decline? Or is society doomed to abandon its "other worldly" illusions
in hopes of forming a government of enlightened self-interest? Neither
option tempts the pallates of democratic citizens. The first option is
difficult to reconcile with Tocqueville's entreaty for a recognition of
the morally responsible individual. For how can an individual be
morally responsible if his actions rely on knowledge der~~ed from myths
deliberately contrived so as to control his behavior.
The latter
option seems even less appealing because of the uncertainty which
necessarily surrounds large-scale social engineering.
How then is Tocqueville's emphasis on religion to be understood?
Is Tocqueville simply wrong about religion and its real impact on
society, or are men really willing to dacrifice the "content of belief
for the satisfaction of believing." 3
If men are not willing to
sacrifice the content of belief for the satisfaction of believing, then
how is an authentic religion to be reconciled with the demands that a
democratic society inevitably imposes upon it?
The answer to these questions is difficult to fully understand at
times, but in light of Tocqueville's dialectic the answer becomes
unmistakably clear. Tocqueville taught that democracy's decline was
inevitable.
Religion, because of the way it must be adapted to
democracy, no longer provides the virtues needed to sustain democracy.
With a major safeguard no longer effective, the decline of democracy is
inevitable. Tocqueville alludes to this teaching a number of times in
his works. For example, he writes: "Once the American republics begin
to degenerate, I think one will easily see that this is so; it will ~!
enough to notice whether the number of political judgments increases."
The decline in religious activity with the corresponding decline of
democratic society is a pessimistic conclusion drawn from what could
otherwise be considered as optimistic assumptions.
Why then did
Tocqueville not attempt to reconcile the conflicting forces into some
"higher synthesis" in which man might enjoy the fruits of religion and
the benefits of egalitarian conditions? Is decline really inevitable?
Tocqueville seems to address these questions but only in a rather
esoteric manner. Yet what may be gleaned from his writings seems to
point toward the idea that enlightened self-interest is also a doctrine
fraught with difficulties that may be irreconcilable.
In the last analysis Tocqueville seems to place his faith in the
possibility of replacing religions with what he calls an "enlightened
spirit of commerce." In the "Author's Introduction to Democracy in
America," Tocqueville describes a society W~;fh has become democratic
and established "in institutions and mores. 11
In his description of
what appears to be a higher form of society, Tocqueville notes that
. . . one can imagine a society in which all men, regarding the
law as their common work, would love it and submit to it without
difficulty; the authority of the government would be respected
as necessary, not as sacred; the love felt toward the head of
the sta~ would not be a passion but a calm and rational
feeling.
Tocqueville continues in the same passage by stating:
Without enthusiasm or the zeal of belief, education and
experience would sometimes induce the citizens to make great
sacrifices; each man being equally weak would feel a like need
for the help of his companions, and knowing that he would not
9

get their support without supplying his, he would easily
appreciate that or him private interest was mixed up with
public interest.
A society of the genre alluded to by Tocqueville would truly be amazing.
Yet what is particularly unique about Tocqueville's description in the
"Introduction" is that the usual references to religion, which are so
common in the main body of the book, are conspicuously absent. Religion
is perhaps tacitly implied at the beginning when he speaks of the
"established customs and mores," since religion might play a part in
their establishment. But the fact that Tocqueville is able to describe
this society without the routine references to religion might be an
indication that religion is not quite as necessary as Tocqueville
elsewhere seems to assert. Tocqueville, it would appear, leaves the
door open for the possibility that society might be able to go beyond
the need for religion and establish itself on enlightened self-interest.
He was keenly aware of America's character as a trading nation and the
vast resources it possesses which would allow for the realization of
dreams and ambitions through the outlet of labor.
If this trading
spirit could be developed within the proper framework, then society
might attain a level which reflected a better life.
The problem, however, remains the route by which such a society
might be achieved, and Tocqueville provides no clear answers in this
respect. It is highly unlikely that democracy could forego religion in
its effort to create the best society. Yet following Tocqueville's
assumptions, the conflicts which necessarily arise when religion and
democracy are combined make it doubtful that man will ever modify his
behavior to meaningfully complete Tocqueville's portraiture of the
"good" society.
So once again, one finds oneself back at the
pessimistic conclusions that, initially, were to be avoided.
·
The problems posed by the combination of religion and democracy and
the grim prospects for the implementation of a doctrine of enlightened
self-interest leave one frustrated with Tocquevi 11 e's explication of
society. But if Tocqueville is read without the preconceptions of the
modern sociologist, who comes complete with his sophisticated methods,
then such a reading can be very rewarding. Tocqueville masterfully
ill umi na tes the many problems that face democracies, which can help
democracy to a better self-understanding if not to a "better society."
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